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Herman: Who Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?

NOTES

WHO CONTROLS THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN BANKRUPTCY?
INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest and most respected
common law privilege for confidential communications.' In fact, the
privilege has been steadfastly defended by courts for over three centuries. 2 Recently, courts have had to address the issue of how, and to
what extent, a debtor's bankruptcy affects his ability to waive or assert the privilege in connection with pre-bankruptcy communications.3 Specifically, courts have faced the dilemma of deciding
whether the corporate debtor or the bankruptcy trustee 4 controls the
corporate debtor's privilege in bankruptcy proceedings.5
Based upon a diverse array of arguments and policies, the majority of courts hold that the trustee can waive the corporate debtor's
privilege, and gain access to confidential information (either oral or
documentary) possessed by the corporation's pre-petition attorneys.
The courts generally do not articulate any consistent underlying theory or policy for such holdings, however, and even within the majority, inconsistent and conflicting arguments permeate the reported decisions. More importantly, courts consistently fail to distinguish
between pre-petition and post-petition communications. Additionally,
some courts confuse the issue of whether the trustee can waive the
corporate debtor's privilege with the issue of whether the trustee can
I. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The attorney-client privilege

was apparently applied for the first time in the case of Berd v. Lovelace, Cary, 88, and courts
have subsequently held that proper administration of the law requires that clients be en-

couraged to confide in the attorneys upon whom they rely for legal advice and assistance.
People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F. 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1902).
2. People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F. 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1902).

3. See infra notes 29-170 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 29, 108.

5. See infra notes 29-170 and accompanying text.
6.

See infra notes 45-170 and accompanying text.
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waive an individual's attorney-client privilege. These courts fail to
recognize that there are sound legal and policy reasons for treating
corporate debtors differently from individual debtors with respect to
the attorney-client privilege.7 Thus, decisions concerning a trustee's
power to waive a corporate debtor's privilege should not be used as
precedent in proceedings where a trustee seeks to waive an individual
debtor's privilege.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Weintraub8 is illustrative. In Weintraub, a
chapter 7 corporate liquidation case, the Court held that the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee.' The
Court left unresolved the issue of who controls the attorney-client
privilege in chapters 9, 11 and 13, and the issue of who controls the
individual debtor's privilege in chapter 7. The Court stressed that its
holding was limited in application to the corporate debtor due to the
specialized role that the trustee plays in corporate bankruptcy
cases.10 If an individual's attorney-client privilege, passes to the trustee, the Court reasoned, it does so for a reason different from that
articulated in the Court's decision regarding corporate debtors.11
At the core of the issue of who controls the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy, in both the individual and corporate debtor situations, is the inexorable tension between the debtor/client's need to
have confidential communications with his attorney protected, and
the creditor's need for a full and complete disclosure of evidence and
information regarding the debtor's affairs and financial status. The
issue generally arises as creditors or the trustee begin to investigate
the conduct and affairs of the debtor in an effort to uncover fraudulent transfers, preferences, avoidable liens, or any other information
relevant to maximizing the debtor's estate.12 Often, the investigation
reveals that the debtor's pre-petition attorney possesses valuable in7. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
8.

105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).

9. Id. at 1994.
10. Id. at 1995.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 29 & 108 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)
(1982 & Supp. 11 1985) (setting out the powers and duties of creditors committees, including

the authorization to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of
the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of

such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan"). See
also II U.S.C. § 343 (Supp. 11 1985) and

BANKR.

R. 2004(d) (Supp. 11 1985) (requiring the

debtor to appear and submit to an examination under oath). Neither § 343 nor Rule 2004
contain an express exception for attorney-client communications.
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formation which the creditors or trustee seek. Subsequently, the
debtor's attorney asserts the privilege as the creditors or trustee seek
to compel the attorney to testify or to turn over the desired information."3 The trustee then executes a waiver of the debtor's privilege,
and tries again to obtain the information. Ultimately, based upon a
motion to compel discovery, the court rules on the issue.
Part I of this Note sets forth the purposes, exceptions, and essential elements of the attorney-client privilege. Part II discusses the
statutory arguments which have been addressed by courts in an effort to discern at least some degree of congressional guidance for
resolving the issue. Part III focuses on the various rationales which
have been advanced in the absence of any meaningful statutory authority resolving the issue of who controls the privilege in bankruptcy. Included in Part III is an analysis of the Supreme Court's
decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,1 4 a decision articulating the Court's present position on who
controls the attorney-client privilege in a chapter 7 corporate liquidation case. Part IV outlines several potential alternatives and solutions, concluding with the proposal that the significant differences
between corporations and individuals in non-bankruptcy attorney-client privilege law should be extended to bankruptcy law. Individual
debtors should retain the privilege while corporate debtors should
lose the privilege whenever a trustee is appointed. Furthermore, in
light of the special problems concerning closely held corporations,
such corporations should be treated similarly to individual debtors in
connection with the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy. Finally,
in all situations, the trustee should not acquire control of the debtor's
privilege over post-petition communications, as this would significantly deter the debtor from seeking post-petition legal advice. Such
deterrence would, in turn, prejudice the debtor's position during the
bankruptcy case and hinder the debtor's efforts to make an informed
and productive fresh start.
I.

PURPOSES AND SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage uninhibited communication between a client and his lawyer
by removing the client's apprehension that the attorney may, at some
future time, be compelled to divulge sensitive information to third
13.
14.

See I1 U.S.C. § 343 (Supp. 11 1985) and
105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).

BANKR.
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parties. 15 By fostering and protecting the unhampered flow of information, the privilege allows attorneys to be more fully informed,
thereby giving sounder legal advice, advocating the client's case
more effectively, and allowing a relationship of trust to develop between the attorney and client."6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has noted that encouraging "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients

.

.

[will] promote broader public inter-

1'
ests in the observance of law and administration of justice.' 1
It is undisputed that the attorney-client privilege applies to litigation in federal courts' 8 and in bankruptcy proceedings.19 Moreover, it is well-established that the privilege attaches regardless of
whether the client is a corporation or an individual.20 As an artificial
entity, however, the corporation (unlike the individual) cannot speak

15. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Gorman v. Martinez (In re
Amjoe, Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 45, 46-47 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976).

The attorney-client privilege is related conceptually to the attorney work product doctrine
in that both rules protect disclosure by an attorney of information and communications relating to the client's legal position. The two doctrines, however, must be differentiated. The attorney-client privilege provides absolute protection from disclosure and is held by the client; the
work product privilege is a qualified privilege which is held by the attorney. The work product
doctrine protects all documents and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. Thus, it is
often broader than the attorney-client privilege because it covers not only the client's own
statements to counsel, but information obtained from witnesses as well. FED. R_ Civ. P.
26(b)(3). The work product doctrine may also afford less protection than the attorney-client
privilege because, unlike the attorney-client privilege, it is restricted to documents and materials prepared for litigation. Additionally, unlike the absolute protection of the attorney-client
privilege, the work product doctrine's protection is qualified and may be lost if the party seeking disclosure can show "substantial need" and "undue hardship." Id.
16. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
45, 47 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976).
17. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
18. FED. R. EVID. 501, which provides the general rule for privileges in federal proceedings, states that "the privilege of a witness, [or] person. . shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience."
19. See, e.g., In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 Bankr. 993, 997-98 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) ("A
claim of attorney/client privilege arising in a discovery proceeding conducted in a bankruptcy
case is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ...except in civil actions where state
substantive law supplies the rule of decision, in which case privilege is determined in accordance with state law." (citations and footnote omitted)). See also BANKR. R. 7026, 9017, and
9032 (incorporating selected provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal
Rules of Evidence into the Bankruptcy Rules); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (information not privileged is discoverable in federal courts); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (attorney's "work product" is
protected from disclosure unless a "substantial need" and "undue hardship" exist); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4-5 (1979) ("a lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client").
20. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1981).
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for itself, but relies upon its officers and agents to waive or assert the
privilege. 1 The corporate client's ability to exercise the privilege
only through its agents was a crucial factor for several courts in determining who is the proper party to assert or waive the privilege in
bankruptcy proceedings.2 2
Since the attorney-client privilege achieves its goals either by
suppressing evidence or preventing discovery and disclosure of information, courts have established rigid requirements for claims of privilege. The essential elements of a claim of privilege are:
1. The asserted holder of the privilege must have sought legal
advice from a professional legal advisor;
2. This legal advisor must have been acting in his professional
capacity;
3. The communication must have been made in confidence by
the client to the legal advisor;
4. The communication must not involve the commission of a
crime or tort; and
5. The privilege 23
must have been affirmatively asserted and not
waived by the client.
The scope of the attorney-client privilege is restricted to communications dealing with wrongful acts already committed.2 4 Excep21. Id. at 390-92; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986,
1991 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1991; Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th
Cir. 1981); Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). The fact that certain documents or information emanate directly or indirectly from
confidential communications between client and counsel is not determinative of a claim of
privilege. Generally, "[the claim of privilege is confirmed only if the client can convince the
court that the subject communication satisfies each element of the privilege and does not come
within an exception." In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 Bankr. 993, 997 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). Furthermore, the privilege is narrowly construed against the party asserting it, to ensure that as
much information as possible is disclosed to the trier of fact. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623,
631-32 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 649 (E.D. Mich.
1977), affd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 391 F. Supp. 1029,
1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[T]he privilege has been confined to a narrow and limited enclave
[and] is strictly limited in purpose and effect....
[..
(citations omitted)).
It is important to note that the privilege protects solely the actual communications between client and counsel. The privilege does not prevent disclosure of facts which may be part
of an attorney-client communication, if such facts are discoverable from other sources. See,
e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
24. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974).
See also In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 Bankr. 993, 999 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) ("[fjurtherance of a
crime or civil fraud is unlawful and vitiates the attorney/client privilege"); United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (privilege does not
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tions to the privilege include communications concerning a client's
contemplated criminal and tortious acts.25 Communications made
prior to or during the commission of a crime, fraud or tort are not

shielded because to do so would allow an attorney to be a principal
or accessory to a crime or tort without fear of discovery, and would
permit clients to commit wrongful acts with the prior advice of
26
counsel.
Due to the judicial recognition of the importance of the privilege, more than a mere allegation of a subsequent wrongful act is
needed to dissolve the protections of the privilege. Rather, a prima
facie case establishing the illegality of the underlying conduct is required to trigger the exception to the privilege.

In the context of

bankruptcy, the wrongful act exception to the privilege includes not
only prospective crimes and torts, but also communications about
prospective fraudulent transfers or preferences.28
II.

THE STATUTORY LAW

Although the attorney-client privilege and bankruptcy proceedings have both been an accepted part of American jurisprudence for
many years, courts have only recently begun to address the issue of
to what extent, if any, a trustee in bankruptcy29 controls a debtor's
apply if the communication was made for the purpose of committing a crime or tort).
25. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C.
1974).
26. Id.
27. See In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 Bankr. 993, 999 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). See also In re
Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (prima facie showing that legal advice was
obtained in furtherance of illegal or fraudulent activity is sufficient to secure disclosure).
28. See, e.g., In re Blier Cedar, 10 Bankr. 993, 999-1000 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Taylor
v. Evans, 29 S.W. 172, 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) (communications to attorney, with goal of
achieving a preference, not protected by the privilege).
29. The trustee represents the estate in a bankruptcy case, and has a duty to act in the
best interest of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1982). See, e.g., In re Washington
Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1979), af'd sub nom. Johnston v. Gilbert, 636
F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1982); DePinto v. United States, 407
F. Supp. 5, 7 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff'd, 585 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[trustee] has a duty...
to realize the maximum profit on the bankruptcy estate" for distribution to creditors); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1965) (trustee "has the duty to
realize the maximum from the estate for distribution to the creditors").
In chapter 7 liquidation cases, a disinterested party is appointed interim trustee soon after
the petition is filed. The interim trustee performs the duties of a trustee until one is selected by
creditors at a subsequent meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702(b) (1982 & Supp. II
1985). If creditors fail to elect a trustee, the interim trustee becomes the permanent trustee. 11
U.S.C. § 702(d) (Supp. 11 1985). For a detailed summary of the role of a trustee in a liquidation case, see B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL %6.07[2] (1980)
[hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL]. See also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. 111985)
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attorney-client privilege.3 0 With r6spect to applicable statutory au-

thority, the courts have found that neither the Bankruptcy Act of
18983' (the Act) nor the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197832 (the
Code) deals with the issue directly.3 3 The Code provision that arguably addresses the issue is section 542(e), which permits a court to
order any person holding recorded information relating to the
debtor's property or financial affairs to turn such information over to
the trustee. This turn over order is "[s]ubject to any applicableprivilege."'3 4 Some debtors have claimed that section 542(e) is a substantive grant of power for debtors to assert the privilege against trust-

ees. 35 The legislative history of section 542(e), however, indicates
that this subsection was designed solely "to deprive accountants and
attorneys of the leverage they held under state law liens to receive
payment in full ahead of other creditors when the information they
(the trustee's statutory duties in a liquidation case under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(the Code)).
In chapter I1 reorganization cases, the appointment of a trustee is not mandatory.
Rather, the debtor remains in possession and performs many of the duties of the trustee. 11
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). In chapter 11, the creditors do not have the right
to elect a trustee, and the court can only appoint a trustee for cause (generally where the
debtor in possession is dishonest or imcompetent), and only after notice and a hearing. 11
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). For a detailed summary of the role of a trustee in chapter 11, see
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra this note, at 5 8.13[2]. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982
& Supp. II 1985) (trustee's statutory duties in reorganization cases under the Code).
In chapter 13 debt adjustment cases, the appointment of a trustee is mandatory, and the

court, rather than creditors, appoints the trustee. See

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL,

supra this

note, at T 9.07. In chapter 13, however, management and operation of the debtor's business
remains with the debtor and is not the responsibility of the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b)-(c)
(Supp. 11 1985).
30. The earliest reported decision appears to be Weck v. District Court of the Second
Judicial Dist., 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d 46 (1967), which dealt with the trustee's power to
waive Colorado's statutory accountant-client privilege. The first reported case to directly address the issue of who can exercise the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy proceedings was
Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1976).
31. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), replacedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1985).
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) (replacing Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544).
33. The Supreme Court noted the lack of statutory authority in Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985): "As might be expected given the
conflict among the courts of appeals, the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly address the
question" of the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy. Id. at 1992.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (Supp. 11 1985) (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1992; Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195
(8th Cir. 1981); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd
sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett, 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
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hold is necessary to the administration of the estate.""a Furthermore,

the legislative history of section 542(e) states that "the extent to
which the attorney-client privilege is valid against the trustee is unclear under current law and is left to be determined by the courts on
a case by case basis."3 7 Thus, the bankruptcy statutory scheme is
deliberately silent and the issue of the trustee's power to exercise the

privilege is expressly delegated to the courts to decide as a matter of
38
federal common law.
At least two courts have looked to Proposed Federal Rule of

Evidence 503(c) as statutory authority for the trustee's power to
waive the debtor's privilege.3 9 In both Citibank v. Andros," and In re
O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.,41 the courts noted that Proposed Rule
503(c) allowed the attorney-client privilege to be "claimed by the
client. . . trustee or similar representative of a corporation,associa-

tion, or other organization, whether or not in existence."42 Both
courts also noted that the Proposed Rule, although not adopted, was

a "fairly authoritative source of federal common law."'43 Relying in
part on Proposed Rule of Evidence 503(c), each court then held that
the trustee was vested with the power to waive the corporate debtor's

attorney-client privilege. In light of the fact that Congress expressly
rejected Proposed Rule of Evidence 503(c) and adopted Federal

Rule of Evidence 501 instead,44 the O.P.M. and Andros courts' reliance on 503(c) appears misplaced.
36. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 369-70
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787.
37. 12 CONG. REC. 33992 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC.
32391-32418 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that § 542(e) was dispositive. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,
105 S.Ct. 1986, 1992 (1985).
38. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also fail to
address directly the issue of who is the proper party to control the attorney-client privilege in
bankruptcy. See supra notes 18 and 19.
39. See Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981); In re O.P.M. Leasing
Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
40. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. 13 Bankr. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
42. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 503(c) (emphasis added).
43. In re O.P.M., 13 Bankr. at 69 (quoting United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840,
842 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)); Andros, 666 F.2d at 1195.
44. FED. R, EvID. 501, adopted instead of Proposed Rule 503(c), provides that claims of
privilege are "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
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III.

THE CASE LAW

In the absence of any meaningful statutory guidance, courts
have attempted to define the parameters of the trustee's power to

exercise the debtor's privilege. The courts have failed to develop any
consistent theories, principles or guidelines. Moreover, the Supreme
Court's decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub45 resolves this issue solely in the chapter 7 corporate liq-

uidation case.46 Although a review of the case law reveals a diverse
array of holdings, the clear majority of courts, including the Supreme Court, hold that the trustee in bankruptcy has the power to

waive or assert the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege.4
Even within the majority, however, there is disagreement about the
45. 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).
46. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
47. Cases holding that the trustee can waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege are: Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985); Shaeffer v. Wagner, 765 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1985); Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing
Servs., Inc.) 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (Sth Cir. 1981);
Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983);
In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re
Featherworks, 25 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); Scroggins v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazier
& Murphy (In re Kaleidoscope, Inc.), 15 Bankr. 232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). Cf. In re
Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984) (court-appointed examiner can waive debtor's attorneyclient privilege); Weck v. District Court of the Second Judicial Dist., 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d
46 (1967) (trustee can waive debtor's accountant-client privilege); In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 41 Bankr. 863 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (trustee can waive debtor's accountant-client privilege).
For cases holding that the trustee does not have the power to waive a corporate debtor's
attorney-client privilege, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d
338 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd., 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985); Hudtwalker v. Van Nostrand & Martin
(In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 40 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (trustee cannot waive
corporate debtor's privilege where party asserting privilege proves the corporation has current
officers or directors); Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hy-Gain
Elecs. Corp., II Bankr. 119 (D. Neb. 1978).
For cases discussing the trustee's power to waive the attorney-client privilege when the
debtor is an individual, see Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342-43 (dictum) (trustee may not waive
individual debtor's privilege); In re Butcher, 38 Bankr. 796, 801 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984)
(trustee may not waive individual debtor's privilege); Silvio de Lindegg, 27 Bankr. at 28 (trustee may waive corporate debtor's privilege but may not waive individual debtor's privilege); In
re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (trustee can waive individual debtor's
privilege).
See also In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 40 Bankr. 56, 57 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) where
the bankruptcy court held that as between former officers/directors and a successor in interest
of the debtor corporation, the successor is the proper party to control the corporate debtor's
privilege because the successor "is for all practical purpose the only entity involved. . . . Unlike a trustee, [the debtor's successor in interest] does 'replace the corporation as an entity'"
and thus controls the privilege (quoting Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 322).
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underlying legal authority for the trustee's ability to control the corporate debtor's privilege.
A.

The Privilege as "Propertyof the Estate"

An argument which has been relied upon by several courts is
that the attorney-client privilege is a form of property which passes
to the trustee, by operation of law, with all the non-exempt property
of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.48 The legal framework for this argument is found in section 70 of the Act 9 and section 541 of the
Code,5 0 which govern what constitutes "property of the estate" in

bankruptcy proceedings. Under both the Act and the Code, the
bankruptcy estate is created by operation of law upon the filing of a
voluntary or involuntary petition.5 1 Through the creation of a bankruptcy estate, the debtor's property becomes subject to the jurisdiction and administration of the bankruptcy court.52 The property of
the bankruptcy estate under the Code consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case," 53 plus certain property acquired within 180 days after
commencement, 54 as well as property recovered pursuant to the trustee's powers to avoid preferential transfers,55 fraudulent conveyances, 56 and various liens. 7 Under the Code, debtors may avail
48. Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 45, 48-49
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976); Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981); Turner v.
Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883, 886 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1983); In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Il1.1983).
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 544, 565, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (repealed
1978).
50. II U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
51. 1I U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. 111985). This section is derived from § 70(a) of
the Act.
52. For a detailed discussion of property of the estate in bankruptcy proceedings, see
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at ch. 4. Neither the Code nor the Act specifically define the word "property."
53. II U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). Unlike § 541, § 70(a) of the Act
listed specific forms of property which passed as part of the bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (repealed 1978).
54. This includes property inherited by the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) (1982 &
Supp. 111985), property acquired by the debtor through a property settlement agreement with
the debtor's spouse or as part of a divorce decree, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. II
1985), and life insurance or death benefits acquired by the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(C)
(1982 & Supp. I 1985). All of the above property is included in the bankruptcy estate only if
it is acquired by the debtor within 180 days after commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
56. I1 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
57. II U.S.C. § 544 (1982 & Supp. I 1985). See also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3)-(4)
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themselves of either the federal or state exemption scheme, 58 which
provide for the removal of certain designated property from the
bankruptcy estate.

Under section 70(a) of the Act and section 541 of the Code, the
property interests passing to the bankruptcy estate for administration include both tangible and intangible property. 59 Furthermore,
the bankruptcy estate does not assume greater property rights than
the interest held by the debtor. Thus, the bankruptcy estate is com-

promised of all non-excluded and non-exempt property of the debtor,
but only to the same degree of interest held by the debtor under non60

bankruptcy law.
One of the earliest and most important cases holding that the
attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee as part of the debtor's

bankruptcy estate is In re Am joe, Inc. 61 In Amjoe, the bankruptcy
(Supp. 11 1985) (providing that all property recovered by the trustee becomes property of the
estate).
58. The debtor has a choice between exemptions allowed by state law, or exemptions
enumerated in the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b) and 522(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). If the
debtor elects his state's exemption scheme, the Code also allows the debtor to take advantage
of exemptions provided by federal non-bankruptcy laws. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1982). Such
federal non-bankruptcy law exemptions are limited in scope and include pension and other
benefits from the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (Supp. 1 1983), the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1982), as well as benefits from the
Veteran's Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982), Railroad Unemployment Insurance, 45
U.S.C. § 352(e) (1982) and retirement pensions for United States Civil Service employees, 5
U.S.C. § 8346(a) (1982).
The Act did not contain a specific exemption scheme, but debtors could exempt property
pursuant to state law and federal non-bankruptcy law. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §
6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (repealed 1978). State exemption schemes vary significantly from state to
state. See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at 1 4.07-4.10 (discussion of both
state and federal exemption schemes). The Code further provides that any state may pass
legislation specifically excluding that state's citizens from electing the federal exemption
scheme in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
59. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544, 565 (repealed 1978);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, II U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). See also BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at 1 4.03 (enumerating various specific types of tangible and intangible property which have been held to be property of the estate).
60. For example, a debtor's legal title to property becomes property of the estate, "only
to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable
interest in such property that the debtor does not hold." I1 U.S.C. § 541(d) (Supp. 11 1985).
61. 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 45, 48-49 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976) (relying on §§ 70(a)
and 70(a)(3) governing property of the estate under the old Bankruptcy Act). For cases explicitly adopting the theory that the privilege passes with property of the estate, see Citibank v.
Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Because the right to decide whether to waive a
corporation's attorney-client privilege belongs to management, the right to assert or waive that
privilege passes with the property of the corporate debtor to the trustee."); Turner v. Davis,
Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883, 886 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983); In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
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court stated that section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 2 vested title
to all non-exempt properties of the bankrupt in the trustee. The
court recognized that the term "property" under section 70(a) was
generally interpreted to include only items subject to lien, levy,
transfer or exclusive possession and ownership.,63 Although the attorney-client privilege did not fit within the established definition of
property under section 70(a), the court reasoned that the privilege
could be characterized as property under section 70(a)(3), which included as property all "powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit."" After finding that the attorney-client
privilege was a power within the meaning of section 70(a)(3), the
court held that such power passed by operation of law to the trustee
along with all of the non-exempt property of the estate.65
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Amjoe opinion is the
argument offered by the court to support its finding that the privilege was within the types of "powers" contemplated by section
70(a)(3). Under section 70(a)(3), "strictly personal" powers do not
pass to the trustee.6 6 Inconcluding that the attorney-client privilege
is not a personal power or personal safeguard, the court explained
that:
[T]he privilege under consideration lacks the characteristics of a
personal privilege in the true sense and.

.

.[was designed] only to

assist litigants to assert or defend a right and in most instances a
property right. .

.

.Thus, since its primary aim is to protect and

foster the interests of actual litigants only and not parties who are
not involved in and have no recognizable valid legal interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the right. . . clearly belongs to the Trustee. . . .To refuse the Trustee the right to waive the privilege
would obviously frustrate. . . the very person for whose benefit the
62. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), relied upon in
AmJoe, was replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326
(1982 & Supp. 11 1985).

63. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978).
See, e.g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915); Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11

(1924). See also Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) ("The most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of 'property' lies in the basic purpose of the Bank-

ruptcy Act to give the debtor a 'new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' ") (citing Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (citations omitted)).
64. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978).
65. Amjoe, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. at 49.
66. Id. (citing 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.13(2) (15th ed. 1985)).
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The flaws in the Amjoe court's reasoning are numerous and
substantial. First, contrary to the AmJoe court's assertion, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the attorney-client privilege is
more than a mere device "to assist litigants."68 Second, the Amjoe
court's notion that the trustee is "the very person for whose benefit
the privilege was designed" 69 is unsupported in law or logic. It is
simply tortured reasoning to say that the privilege was designed to
benefit a bankruptcy trustee rather than the corporate client, especially where the communication in question is a pre-petition communication between the corporation and its attorney.70 Similarly, the
court's finding that the rights protected by the privilege are "in most
instances a property right" 7' 1 is irrelevant because the privilege was
designed to protect all disclosures of confidential communications between client and counsel, regardless of whether the information relates to property rights, liberty interests or any other rights of the
client. The fact that most of the reported privilege cases involve
"property rights" should not be part of the analysis in determining
whether the privilege is property of the estate in bankruptcy.
Despite the Amjoe court's logic, it does not necessarily follow
that, since the privilege usually protects property rights, the privilege
itself must be "property." This reasoning is implicit in In re Hy-Gain
Electronics Corp.,72 where the district court of Nebraska affirmed a
bankruptcy court determination that the trustee could not waive the
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. In Hy-Gain, both the
bankruptcy court and district court rejected the Amjoe view that the
privilege could fall within the purview of property of the estate by
classifying it as a non-personal power of the debtor under section
67. Amjoe, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. at 49.
68. See supra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
69. Amjoe, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. at 49.

70. See Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). At issue were communications between the debtor and its attorneys prior to bankruptcy. The court stated that

"it seems

. . . almost

axiomatic that the beneficiary of such communications is the bankrupt

corporation itself, whose interests are quite obviously adverse to the interests of the trustee in

bankruptcy, representing the general creditors." Id. (emphasis omitted). See also Hudtwalker
v. Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 40 Bankr. 34, 40 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1984) (court relied on Ross, stating that "[t]he right to assert an attorney-client
privilege as to pre-petition matters should be, perhaps, one legal right of the debtor to remain
unscathed after a trustee has been appointed").
71. Amjoe, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. at 49.
72. 11 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1978).
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70(a)(3). 7 3 The district court in Hy-Gain failed, however, to articulate what constitutes property of the estate under section 70(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act. Instead, the court based its holding on a simplistic "label" argument: "I cannot conclude that the right to waive
or claim an attorney-client privilege is a form of property pursuant
to section 70. . .. [M]y conclusion is that the right to claim or

waive the privilege is a privilege and not a form of property. 7 4
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, in Citibank v. Andros,7 reversed, and held that the trustee was vested with the power to waive
the corporate debtor's privilege.76 The Eighth Circuit concluded that,
"[b]ecause the right to decide whether to waive a corporation's attorney-client privilege belongs to management, the right to assert or
waive the privilege passes with the property of the corporate debtor
to the trustee. '77 Like the district court, the Eighth Circuit failed to
adequately articulate how the privilege constitutes property of the
estate.
A critical flaw with Andros and the other cases holding that the
attorney-client privilege is property of the estate under section 70,
passing to the trustee by operation of law, is that none of these
courts analyzed the issue under traditional "property of the estate"
tests as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Segal v.
Rochelle78 and Lines v. Frederick.79 In Segal, the issue was whether
loss-carry-back tax refund claims due a debtor as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case constitute property under section 70(a)
of the former Act."' Similarly, in Lines, the Court addressed
whether accrued vacation pay owed to the debtor on the date of
bankruptcy was property under section 70(a).1 In both Segal and
Lines, the Supreme Court emphasized that the term "property"
under the Bankruptcy Act is to be defined in relation to the purposes
and policies of the Act. The Supreme Court stressed that "[t]he
most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition
73.

Hy-Gain, I1 Bankr. at 120. In Hy-Gain, the liquidation petitions were filed prior to

the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978; thus Hy-Gain, like Amjoe, was
governed by § 70. See Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1193, n. 3 (8th Cir. 1981).
74. Hy-Gain, I I Bankr. at 120.
75. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).

76. Id.
77. Id. at 1195. In addition, the Eighth Circuit relied on Proposed FED. R. EvID. 503(c).
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
78.

382 U.S. 375 (1966).

79. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
80. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
81. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
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'property' lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the
debtor a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt." 82 The analysis of what constitutes property under section
70(a), according to the Supreme Court, turns upon whether the item
in question is needed for the debtor's fresh start, and whether including the item as property of the estate serves to further the policies
and purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.
Accordingly, courts interpreting section 70(a) of the Act should
focus upon whether the attorney-client privilege as to pre-petition
communications is necessary for the debtor's fresh start. Clearly
many, if not all, debtors seek legal advice as they prepare to embark
upon the path toward a fresh start. If the debtor's attorney can be
compelled to disclose the debtor's confidences at a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, then such communications by the debtor will be
"chilled," and an attorney-client relationship based on trust will not
be established. The debtor will be reluctant to disclose all necessary
information, and the attorney, in turn, will be unable to furnish complete and accurate advice to help guide the debtor toward a fresh
start. Such a result would hamper the debtor's ability to make a
fresh start and thwart an essential policy of bankruptcy law. Had the
courts in Andros and Amjoe applied the appropriate "property of
the estate" test as set forth in Segal and Lines, the privilege might
not have been found to be property under section 70(a). 3
Two years after Andros, the Eighth Circuit's argument that the
privilege was property of the estate was adopted by two bankruptcy
courts, without further analysis, in In re Investment Bankers,"4 and
In re National Trade Corp. 5 In Investment Bankers, the bankruptcy
court's failure to elaborate on the "property" theory is significant in
light of the fact that in the interim between Andros and Investment
Bankers, section 70(a), governing property of the estate, was repealed and replaced by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act."
82. Id. at 19 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45) (citations omitted). In Lines, the Court held that accrued vacation pay due to the debtor as of the date of
bankruptcy did not constitute property of the estate under § 70(a). See also Segal, 382 U.S. at
379-80 (holding that the loss-carryback tax refund claims due the creditor on the date of
bankruptcy were property of the estate under § 70(a)).
83. It is interesting to note that neither Segal nor Lines is cited by Andros or Amjoe or
any other court addressing whether the privilege was property under § 70(a).
84. 30 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
85. 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). For a discussion of property of the estate
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Unlike section 70(a)(3) of the Act, section 541 of the Code does
not contain an express provision including "powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit"' within property of
the estate.18 Thus, section 70(a)(3), the critical provision for Andros
and other courts in the formulation of the privilege as property notion, no longer existed at the time Investment Bankers was decided.89
Additionally, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
states that the new Code "has the effect of over-ruling Lines v. Frederick."90 Since the leading Supreme Court case interpreting property
of the estate under section 70(a) was explicitly overruled by Congress prior to the decision in Investment Bankers, the time was ripe
for a reevaluation of the "privilege as property of the estate" concept. The Investment Bankers court failed, however, to address how
section 541 of the Code differed from section 70(a) of the Act with
respect to property of the estate. Moreover, the court neglected to
consider how the Andros court's interpretation of section 70(a) was
applicable to an interpretation of section 541. Instead, the court disposed of the issue in a perfunctory manner by simply citing Andros
as authority for the proposition that the privilege was property of the
estate and therefore passed to the trustee.91
Had the Investment Bankers court reexamined whether the
privilege was property under the new Code provision, it would have
found a more plausible basis for its holding than mere reliance on
Andros. Under section 541, property of the estate is comprised of all
of the property in which the debtor has a legal or equitable interest,
as of the date of the commencement of the case.9 2 Section 541, unlike section 70, includes exempt property in the estate subject to the
debtor's subsequent election to exempt particular items from incluunder § 541, see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
Although decided only fifty days earlier than Investment Bankers, National Trade Corp.
was governed by the old Act due to the date of the commencement of the case. In fact, the
voluntary chapter 11 petition of the debtor in National Trade was filed only one month before
the effective date of the new Code.
87. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978).
88. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) with Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch, 541, § 70(a)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 546 (repealed 1978).
89. For an example of the importance of § 70(a)(3) in the determination that the attorney-client privilege was property of the estate, see Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976).
90. H.R. REP, No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977), reprinted in 1978 US. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787.
91. 30 Bankr. at 886.
92. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a) and 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
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sion in the estate.9 Additionally, while section 70(a)(5) required
that property be transferable by the debtor or subject to judicial levy
in order to be included in the estate, this requirement is not included
in section 541. 94 Finally, unlike section 70, section 541 includes all
assets within the property of the estate, even those needed for a fresh
95
start.
The scope of property of the estate under section 541 is therefore significantly broader than it was under section 70 of the former
Act. Accordingly, the Investment Bankers court could have avoided
reliance on questionable precedent by arguing that, under the expansive reach of section 541, the attorney-client privilege is included as
property of the estate.
The crucial flaw in this argument, however, is that it begs the
question of whether the privilege is property. Arguing that section
541 includes as much property in the estate as possible does not resolve the issue of whether or not the privilege is in and of itself property. Section 541 solves only the second part of the puzzle, by including all property within the estate; the first part, determining
whether the privilege is itself property, remains unresolved because
the Code does not define the word property.9 6 Moreover, the issue
remains unresolved because the Supreme Court, although given the
opportunity in the Weintraub case, 97 declined to address the "privilege as property" theory. 98
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the issue, lower
courts should refrain from adopting the theory that the debtor's attorney-client privilege is a form of property which passes to the trustee pursuant to section 541 of the Code. Such a determination creates severe inequities and adverse consequences. Under the Code,
93. See

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL,

supra note 29, at

4.03.

94. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978);
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. H 1985); BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at T
4.03.
95. II U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
96. The Act also did not define the word "property" in relation to § 70(a). The Supreme
Court in Lines and Segal defined property of the estate under § 70(a) to exclude property
needed by the debtor for a fresh start, and to include property which would serve to promote
the policies and purposes of the Act. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
97. The issue of whether the privilege is property of the estate was presented to the
Supreme Court at oral arguments in the Weintraub case. See Summary of Arguments Before
the Supreme Court, 53 U.S.L.W. 3679 (argued Mar. 19, 1985). The Weintraub decision is
discussed infra at notes 108-49 and accompanying text.
98. Despite hearing oral arguments on the "privilege as property" notion, the Weintraub
Court's decision was silent on this matter. But see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text
(argument suggesting that the "property" rationale was adopted in Weintraub).
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debtors in chapter 7 liquidation proceedings must have a trustee appointed and must surrender all non-exempt property of the estate to
the trustee.99 In chapter 11 reorganization cases, the debtor generally remains in possession, without the appointment of a trustee. 10 0
Thus, if the attorney-client privilege is property of the estate, all
chapter 7 debtors will forfeit their privilege while chapter 11 debtors
will not. Similarly, in chapter 13 debt adjustment cases, although a
trustee must be appointed,1 01 the debtor remains in possession of all
property of the estate.10 2 Therefore, if the privilege is property of the
estate, chapter 13 debtors will never lose the privilege while chapter
7 debtors will always lose the privilege. Such a policy of discrimina-.
tion against chapter 7 debtors, based solely upon vague property notions, is unwarranted.10 3
Furthermore, in chapter 11 cases, a trustee may be appointed if
the debtor in possession is inefficient or incompetent.1 04 Accordingly,
some chapter 11 debtors who have a trustee appointed will lose the
privilege, by operation of law, solely because of poor management
skills. This disparate treatment of chapter 11 debtors vis a vis other
chapter 11 debtors lacks a sound basis in law or policy. Finally, section 1105 provides that, at any time before confirmation of a plan,
the court "may terminate the trustee's appointment and restore the
debtor to possession and management" of the property of the estate.10 5 If the privilege is property of the estate, some chapter 11
debtors will lose their attorney-client privilege to the trustee, and
subsequently regain it pursuant to section 1105. This "ping-pong"
treatment of the debtor's attorney-client privilege in chapter 11 cases
chills attorney-client communications, creates instability and deni99. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). In chapter 11, a trustee is only appointed for cause
and after notice and a hearing. Id.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1982).
103. See Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir. 1981). In that case, the
debtor argued that the trustee could only control the debtor's privilege in a chapter 11 reorganization case since, in chapter 11, the trustee represents the bankrupt corporation, whereas,
in chapter 7 liquidation cases, the trustee represents the interest of creditors. Id. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the chapter 7 conflict of interest argument, noting that "[wie fail to see the
significance of appellees' distinction. The trustee in a reorganization or a liquidation has a
fiduciary obligation to treat all parties fairly." Id. See also Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986, 1994-95 (1985) (no merit to respondent's contention
that trustee should not obtain control over the privilege because, unlike management, trustee's
loyalty extends to creditors, not shareholders).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. 11 1985).
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grates the "time honored" and "sacred" attorney-client privilege.106

The argument that the privilege
is property under section 541
10 7
should, therefore, be discarded.

B.

The Privilege and the Trustee as "Representative
of the Estate"

An argument related to the property theory which has been utilized by several courts is that, since the bankruptcy laws designate
the trustee as legal representative of the estate and vest in him extensive powers to manage, conduct and investigate the affairs of the

corporate debtor, 08 the privilege must pass to the trustee. According
to this view, such a result enables the trustee to function effectively

and in accordance with statutory requirements. 0 9 In Commodity
106. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
107. It is interesting to note that the "privilege as property" argument was not set forth
as a priority argument by the U.S. Government in Weintraub. In fact, Mr. Bruce Kuhlik,
assistant to the Solicitor General, while arguing on behalf of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, stated to the Supreme Court at oral argument that the privilege as an "asset" or
"property" of the estate was not the government's "preferred position." See Summary of Arguments Before the Supreme Court, supra note 97.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1982) designates the trustee as legal representative of the estate,
and allows the trustee to sue and be sued in this capacity. The trustee also has statutory duties
to (1) investigate any fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, mismanagement, or irregularity in the
management of the debtor's affairs, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(4) and 1106(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. II
1985); (2) operate the debtor's business, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721 and 1108 (1982 & Supp. II1985);
(3) investigate the acts, conduct, accounts, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, 11
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985); (4) set aside fraudulent transfers, preferences
and unperfected security interests, 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 547, 544 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985); (5)
avoid certain liens, 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985); (6) use, sell or lease
property of the debtor's estate in the ordinary course of the debtor's business without court
approval, and if outside the ordinary course of business, the trustee may do so after notice and
a hearing, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c)(l) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985); (7) assume or reject executory
contracts or unexpired leases subject to the court's approval, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp.
11 1985); (8) have property of the debtor, whether in the debtor's possession or in possession of
a third party, accounted for and turned over to the trustee, 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 542 (1982 &
Supp. I 1985); and (9) collect and reduce to money all non-exempt property of the debtor,
and maximize the value of the estate, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704 and 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
109. Courts adopting or relying on the argument that the privilege vests in the trustee
due to the trustee's status as representative of the estate are: Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985); In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir.
1984); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub
nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982);
Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981); Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater &
Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883, 887 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); Gorman
v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 45, 49 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976);
Weck v. District Court of the Second Judicial Dist., 161 Colo. 384, 387-88, 422 P.2d 46, 48

(1967). But see Hudtwalker v. Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 40
Bankr. 34, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("trustee as representative" argument expressly
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Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,"' the Supreme Court,
in a unanimous opinion,"' applied this reasoning to a corporate
debtor in a liquidation proceeding and held that the corporate
debtor's attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee.
In Weintraub, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
filed a complaint against Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers
(CDCB) alleging that it had violated provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act' 1 2 while operating as a discount commodity brokerage
house. Subsequently, a voluntary chapter 7 liquidation petition was
filed on behalf of CDCB." 3 Thereafter, the Commission served a
subpoena upon Gary Weintraub, former attorney for the corporate
debtor, seeking information in connection with the Commission's investigation of CDCB." 4 The attorney, however, asserted the debtor's
attorney-client privilege. As a result, the Commission moved to compel answers from Weintraub and CDCB's trustee executed a waiver
of the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege.1 5 The Commission's motion to compel answers was granted by a United States
magistrate and upheld by the district court based upon the trustee's
waiver of the debtor's privilege.1 16
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed" 7 and held that the
corporate debtor retained control of the privilege. The court distinguished In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.,"18 where the Second
Circuit held that the trustee can assert or waive the corporate
debtor's privilege when there are no remaining officers or directors of
the corporate debtor. Since CDCB still had present management," 9
the Seventh Circuit determined that the O.P.M. reasoning was not
applicable.'2 0 The Seventh Circuit noted that the attorney-client
privilege was vested in CDCB's management, and that the trustee
did not "succeed to the positions of the officers and directors of the
rejected).
110. 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).
Ill. Weintraub was an 8-0 decision. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
112. 7 U.S.C. § 6(d)(2) (1982).
113. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985).
114, Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1983).
118. 13 Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett, 670 F.2d 383
(2d Cir. 1982).
119. 722 F.2d at 339, n.3.
120. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O.P.M.
decision.
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corporation." 21
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument that the attorney-client privilege of the debtor passed to the trustee as property of
the estate.122 More importantly, the court explicitly rejected the argument that the corporate debtor's privilege passed to the trustee
pursuant to the broad management powers granted to the trustee
under the Code.123 The court then proceeded to support its holding
in favor of the debtor with four separate arguments.
First, the court stated that the trustee, despite his broad management powers, did not replace the corporation as an entity nor succeed to the position of director or officer of the corporation. 124 Second, the Seventh Circuit noted that, since the individual debtor's
privilege did not pass to the trustee, it would be inequitable to treat
corporate debtors differently. 125 Third, the court found that holding
in favor of the trustee would discriminate against corporate debtors
solely "on the basis of a change in economic circumstances," '1 26 because corporations would control their own privilege only so long as
they remained solvent. Finally, the Seventh Circuit cited the potential chilling effect on attorney-client communications which would
result if the attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee, because
corporate clients would "be wary of communicating fully with their
attorneys for fear that sensitive information could subsequently be
27
disclosed due to bankruptcy.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' 2 reversed the Seventh
Circuit,' 29 and adopted the "trustee as representative of the estate"
argument. The Court approached the resolution of the privilege issue
under the guidelines previously set forth in Butner v. United
States. 30 In Butner, the Supreme Court held that, unless some federal interest would be impaired, property interests in bankruptcy are
121.

722 F.2d at 342.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court cited no authority for the proposition that individuals and corporations are or should be treated equally. See infra notes 184-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion advocating that corporations and individuals should be treated dissimilarly in bankruptcy since these entities are treated dissimilarly under state law.
126. Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 343.
127. Id.
128. 105 S. Ct. 321 (1984).
129. 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).
130. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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defined pursuant to state law.131 According to the Court, the application of Butner to the attorney-client privilege issue required a consideration of "the roles played by the various actors of a corporation in
to the role played
bankruptcy to determine which is most analogous
13 2
by the management of a solvent corporation."
The Court noted that, outside of bankruptcy, the attorney-client
privilege is controlled by the management of a corporation and that,
therefore, "the actor whose duties most closely resemble those of
management should control the privilege in bankruptcy. 13 3 By comparing the roles of the chapter 7 trustee 34 and the corporate debtor's
board of directors,1 35 the Court concluded that the trustee, representing the corporate debtor's estate during bankruptcy, plays a role
13 6
closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management.
After finding that no federal interest would be impaired by vesting
the privilege in the trustee,137 the Court held that "the trustee of a
corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the corporation's
privilege with respect to prebankruptcy
attorney-client
communications." 138
The Weintraub decision raises as many questions as it answers.
Although the Court adopts the "trustee as representative" theory,
Weintraub is silent on whether the attorney-client privilege is property of the estate which passes to the trustee upon the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.1 39 The Weintraub Court's extensive reliance on
Butner v. United States,140 however, implicitly raises this issue. In
131.
132.

Id. at 54-55.
105 S. Ct. at 1992.

133.
134.

Id. at 1993.
The Court noted that the trustee is the representative of the estate, 11 U.S.C.

§

323 (1982), and "'is accountable for all property received.'" Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1993
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(2), 1106(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985)). The Court also relied upon
(1) the duty to investigate the debtor's financial affairs, 11 U.S.C. § 704(4) (Supp. 11 1985);

(2) the power to sue to recover preferential and fraudulent transfers of the debtor's property,
11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1982 & Supp. II 1985); (3) the power to use, sell, or lease property,
I I U.S.C. § 363(b) (Supp. 11 1985); (4) the power to operate the debtor's business, 11 U.S.C.

§ 1108 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985); and (5) the power to enter into certain transactions without
court approval, II U.S.C. § 363(e)(1) (1982). Id.

135. The Court summarized the directors' role in chapter 7 cases as "severely limited"
and consisting solely of turning over the corporation's property to the trustee and providing
information to the trustee and creditors. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1993. See also 11 U.S.C. §§
521 and 343 (Supp. 11 1985).

136. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1993.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1996.

139. See supra notes 48-107 and accompanying text.
140.

440 U.S. 48 (1979). See 105 S. Ct. at 1992.
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Butner, the Supreme Court held that property rights were determined in bankruptcy by state law unless some overriding federal interest was present. The reliance on Butner, therefore, may be read as
an acknowledgement that the privilege is to be considered a property
right. Because the "privilege as property of the estate" theory has
numerous logical and legal shortcomings, 141 lower courts should refrain from adopting this theory solely on the basis of the Weintraub
Court's reliance on Butner.
A second question raised by Weintraub concerns the present
status of the Butner holding. In Butner, only state-created rights
were at issue. The attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy, however,
is governed by federal law.1 42 The Weintraub Court's use of Butner
to resolve the privilege issue implies that the Butner rationale is no
longer limited solely to determining state property rights in bankruptcy. Alternatively, the application of Butner to the privilege issue
may be read as holding that the attorney-client privilege is now to be
viewed as a matter of state law rather than federal law. Thus, the
Court's use of Butner to clarify who controls the privilege has cast a
shadow of confusion over the status of Butner and the status of the
privilege in federal courts as a federal right.
The manner in which Butner was used to support the "trustee
as representative of the estate" theory is also suspect. For example,
Butner clearly stands for the proposition that property rights should
not be "analyzed differently [than under state law] simply because
1 Suban interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding."' 43
stantive rights should not change solely as a result of the "'happenstance of bankruptcy.' "144 The Weintraub Court attempted to ad-

here to this principle by comparing the role of the trustee with the
role of a corporation's board of directors during bankruptcy, in order
to determine which entity was most closely analogous to corporate
management outside of bankruptcy. 45 The Court failed to consider,
however, that the trustee is purely a statutory creation of the Code
and, as such, does not exist outside of the context of bankruptcy. In
addition, the Court cited numerous powers which are available to the
141.

See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the flaws and

problems
passes to
142.
143.

of adopting the theory that the attorney-client privilege is a form of property which
the trustee with the debtor's non-exempt assets.
See supra notes 18-19.
440 U.S. at 55.

144. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
145.

Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1992.
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trustee, 146 but failed to address these powers in the context of the
actual role played by liquidation trustees. In the vast majority of
chapter 7 cases, the trustee's role is simply to reduce the corporation's assets to cash for distribution to creditors. Despite the Court's
finding that the trustee has "wide-ranging management authority
over the debtor, ' 147 in pragtice, the trustee's chapter 7 "management" role is extremely limited.
Finally, the attempt to use Butner to resolve the privilege issue
by analogy to non-bankruptcy actors and their roles is undermined
by the Weintraub Court's own statement that "bankruptcy causes
'
fundamental changes in the nature of corporate relationships. "148
There may be situations where rights are affected merely by the
"happenstance of bankruptcy," and, thus, the Butner approach of
resolving the issue as it would be done outside of bankruptcy may
not always be appropriate. Perhaps the issue of who controls the attorney-client privilege is such a situation. It should be noted that no
other court addressing the privilege issue relied on Butner, or even
cited Butner. Clearly, the Court could have held that the trustee as
representative of the estate controls the corporate debtor's privilege,149 without relying on Butner. Despite the legal and logical deficiencies of the Weintraub Court's approach, the "trustee as representative of the estate" theory prevails, at least in chapter 7 corporate
liquidation cases.
C. Miscellaneous Theories in Favor of the Trustee
1. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(4). Aside from the "property" and "trustee as representative" theories,
courts have relied, in varying degrees, on a variety of secondary arguments to support a holding that the trustee in bankruptcy can
waive or assert the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. Usually, these secondary arguments have been asserted in combination
with, or as a buttress to, the "property" and/or "trustee as representative" theories. For example, in In re Investment Bankers,150 a trustee deposed the corporate debtor's former attorneys regarding
146.
147.

Id. at 1993.
Id.

148.

Id. at 1994.

149. See supra note 109 for a list of courts adopting the "trustee as representative of the
estate" argument, without relying on Butner.
150. 30 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
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$87,517.80 in fees paid to the attorneys.1 51 The trustee also sought
production of documents from the attorneys. 52 The attorneys, asserting the privilege, refused to testify orally regarding the services
rendered for the fees at issue and instead submitted brief "summaries" of the nature of the documents sought.1 53 The trustee, alleging
that the payment of fees was a preference and a fraudulent transfer,
brought a
executed a waiver of the corporate debtor's privilege,1 5and
4
motion in the bankruptcy court to compel discovery.
The bankruptcy court, quoting from Citibank v. Andros, concluded that the privilege passed to the trustee with the property of
the corporate estate.1 55 The court also relied extensively on DR 4101 (C) (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his or her fee or defend himself or his employees or
associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. ' 5 Because
the trustee attacked the award of attorneys' fees and the basis upon
which such fees were incurred, it was "necessary for the attorneys to
come forward and defend their fees or surrender them."1 57 Accordingly, the court found the attorneys' assertion of the privilege to be
without merit, by interpreting DR 4-101(C) (4) as specifically releasing attorneys from their bond of secrecy in order to establish a fee or
to "'defend

. .

.against an accusation of wrongful conduct.'

1.58

If the Investment Bankers interpretation of DR 4-101(C)(4) is
correct, much of the debate about who controls the debtor's privilege
is rendered moot. Even if the privilege remains with, and is asserted
by, the debtor, DR 4-101(C)(4) will exclude a substantial amount of
the corporate client's communications from protection under the
privilege and the trustee often will not need the power to waive the
debtor's privilege.1 59 The Investment Bankers court failed to realize,
151.
152.

Id. at 885.
Id.

153.

Id.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 886.
156. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1979) (footnotes omitted).
157. In re Investment Bankers, 30 Bankr. at 886.
158. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4)
(1979)). See also In re Featherworks Corp., 25 Bankr. 634, 643-45. (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(DR 4-101(C)(4) similarly utilized to defeat an attorney's claim of privilege).
159. See, e.g., In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (creditor deposed
debtor to determine whether trustee might have a cause of action for malpractice against
debtor's insurance company attorneys); In re Investment Bankers, 30 Bankr. at 885 (trustee
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however, that DR 4-101(C)(4) is a permissive, rather than
mandatory, disclosure provision. It allows an attorney the discretion

to reveal client confidences if necessary to collect a fee from a recalcitrant client, or to defend a malpractice suit or breach of professional ethics claim.160 Contrary to the Investment Bankers interpre-

tation, DR 4-101(C)(4) does not make all communications between
client and attorney relating to fees "fair game" for disclosure. Such
an interpretation would render the attorney-client privilege meaningless since a trustee could waive the debtor's privilege merely by suing
the debtor's attorney, and then depose the attorney
concerning the
16
.
debtor.
the
for
rendered
services
and
fees received
2. State Corporate Law. - In In re O.P.M. Leasing Services,
Inc.,"6 2 the Second Circuit resolved the issue of who controls the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy by looking to
state corporate law. The district court in O.P.M. relied on the "trustee as legal representative" theory and the "privilege as property"
theory to hold that the trustee had the power to waive or assert the

chapter 11 corporate debtor's privilege.16 3 On appeal, the Second
deposed debtor's attorneys seeking information on whether fees paid to attorneys were a fraudulent or preferential transfer); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 66 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (information sought concerned charges of fraud against debtor and all who
may have engaged in or aided the fraudulent conduct, including debtor's former attorneys); In
re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1983) (trustee sought information
regarding $66,000 paid to debtor's attorneys). In all of the foregoing cases, DR 4-101(C)(4)
could have been applied since the underlying claims related to "establishing" the attorneys'
fees and "accusations" against the attorneys which needed to be "defended." Thus, under the
Investment Bankers reasoning, the issue of who controls the privilege need not have been addressed because, even if the privilege were asserted, the information sought fell within the
scope of discoverable information pursuant to DR 4-I01(C)(4) as a "mandatory" discovery
device.
160. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1979)
which states that "[a] lawyer may reveal" certain confidences. Id. (emphasis added).
161. The flaws in using DR 4-101(C)(4) as a mandatory disclosure device are well illustrated in the area of post-petition attorney-debtor/client communications. The Code and the
Bankruptcy Rules have established an elaborate scheme which requires a debtor's post-petition
counsel to keep detailed records and books stating the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 329 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) and BANKR. R. 2014,
2016 and 2017 (Supp. 11 1985). Such documents and statements must be presented to the
court as part of the debtor's attorney's application for compensation. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1985). If DR 4-101(C)(4) was interpreted as compelling disclosure of all attorneyclient communications necessary to establish or collect a fee, then a post-petition debtor's privilege would be meaningless since all post-petition services by the debtor's attorney must be
recorded and presented to the court, and the attorney could be compelled to reveal all postpetition communications with the debtor concerning such fees.
162. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir.

1982).
163.

13 Bankr. at 64, 67-68.
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Circuit affirmed, but specifically declined to decide the issue of
whether the privilege was property of the estate or was a necessary
164
element of the trustee's powers and status as legal representative.
The Second Circuit, instead, found traditional state corporate law
dispositive. After noting "the crucial fact"'16 5 that no board of directors of O.P.M. was presently in existence, the court narrowed the
issue to a choice between vesting the privilege in O.P.M.'s shareholders or the trustee. The court held that "as codified in New York
Business Corporation Law Sec. 701 . . .management of a corpora-

tion is a function vested in a board of directors, which function may
be delegated only to corporate officers. Shareholders have no power
to do anything except elect the members of the Board."' 66 Accordingly, the court found the privilege must "adhere" to the trustee "by
virtue of the nonexistence of any other entity authorized to so
67
act.'
Although decided prior to Weintraub, O.P.M.'s reliance on state
corporate law is consistent with the Weintraub Court's reliance on
Butner v. United States.6 8 The O.P.M. reasoning prevents a creditor
or the trustee from receiving the windfall of power over the debtor's
privilege "merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."' 69
A state law analysis, however, has the potential to encourage forum
shopping and inconsistent results, as well as to virtually eliminate
any uniformity in case law governing what is a federal, rather than
state, right or privilege as defined by Federal Rule of Evidence
501.

°

In short, a federal right should not be decided by each state's

particular corporation laws. Finally, in some situations, it may not be
necessary for the court to vest the privilege in the trustee simply
because no board of directors exists. The court may be able to ad164. 670 F.2d at 386. The court stated: "In affirming the order of the bankruptcy judge,
this court need not decide whether to adopt the broad holding of the district court that the

attorney-client privilege of a corporate debtor passes by operation of law to its trustee in bankruptcy." Id. The court also noted, "we

. .

.find it unnecessary to accept the district court's

emphasis on property concepts as the basis for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context." Id. at n.2.
165. Id. at 386.
166. Id. at 387.
167. Id. The clear inference from the court's holding is that, had there been present
management of O.P.M., the privilege would not have passed to the trustee. See Hudtwalker v.
Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 40 Bankr. 34, 39-40 (Bankr.

E.D.N.Y. 1984) (privilege does not pass to trustee where party asserting the privilege can
prove that
168.
169.
170.

the corporate debtor has present officers or directors).
440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
Id. (citation omitted).
FED. R. EvID. 501.
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journ the proceedings until a new board, empowered to speak for the
corporate client, is elected.
IV.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AND SOLUTIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Weintraub'7 1 does not resolve the issue of who controls the attorney-client privilege in all situations. Clearly, the holding is binding in chapter 7 corporate liquidation cases. It is not clear,
however, which other entities in chapter 7 fall within the purview of
Weintraub.17 2 Similarly, it is unclear whether Weintraub applies to
corporations outside of chapter 7.173 Although the Court spoke in

general terms about "corporate debtors" at several points in the
opinion, the Court simply was not presented with the issue of who
controlled the attorney-client privilege in chapters 9, 11 or 13. With
respect to individuals (in all chapters), the Weintraub Court stated
that its "holding . . .has no bearing on the problem of individual

bankruptcy which we have no reason to address in this case.'' 7 4 In
light of the Court's own statement that it was addressing a limited
issue, the most prudent position for lower courts to adopt is that
Weintraub is binding only in chapter 7 corporate liquidation cases.
The issue of who controls the privilege, therefore, remains unresolved
in all but a limited area.
A. Ex parte Fuller
Despite the incalculable number of situations in which the issue
of who controls the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy may arise,
there is at least one potential solution which may be applied to all
debtors in all chapters and circumstances. This single solution model
entails extending the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Fuller'7 5
to the attorney-client privilege area.
In Fuller, a partnership and the individual partners were in
171. 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985).
172. In addition to individuals and corporations, many other entities are eligible to be
debtors in chapter 7, including associations (incorporated or unincorporated), partnerships
(general or limited), unincorporated companies, and business trusts. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b),
101(8), 101(33) (1982).
173, Even if Weintraub applies to corporations outside of chapter 7, it is unclear which
other non-corporate debtors would fall under the Weintraub holding outside of chapter 7. Such
debtors include those listed in note 146 supra, as well as municipalities (chapter 9 only), sole
proprietorships, and joint ventures.
174. 105 S.Ct. at 1995 (emphasis added).
175. 262 U.S. 91 (1923).
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bankruptcy. 7 The trustee in bankruptcy sought, and was granted,
an order directing the debtors, the receiver, and the debtor's attorneys to turn over all of the books, records, and documents of the
debtors, both as individuals and as a partnership. 7 Additionally, the
District Attorney of New York County sought the same records for
7 The
a state court proceeding by serving a subpoena duces tecum."'
debtors objected to turning over the books and papers on the grounds
that the fourth and fifth amendments protected them from being
forced to turn over any incriminating evidence which they owned,
possessed or controlled. 79
The Supreme Court rejected the debtors' arguments and held
that:
A man who becomes bankrupt. . . has no right to delay the legal
transfer of the possession and title of any of his property to the
officers appointed by law for its custody or for its disposition, on
the ground that the transfer of such property will carry with it incriminating evidence against him. His property and its possession
pass from him by operation . . . of law, and when control and possession have passed from him, he has no constitutional right to prevent its use for any legitimate purpose. 80
In essence, the Supreme Court reasoned that, although the incriminating books of the debtor are in the debtor's (and his attorney's)
possession, the title and right to possession passes to the trustee by
operation of law. The debtors, therefore, may not assert their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination since the property now
constructively resides with the trustee.
Fuller may be applied to the attorney-client privilege area as
follows: If a constitutional privilege will not prevent the passing of
the debtor's books to the trustee (even where incriminating information is contained therein), then surely the debtor's attorney-client
176. Id. at 92.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 93.
180. Id. Fuller has only been cited by three courts faced with the issue of who controls
the debtor's attorney-client privilege. See In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1984)
(debtor's attorney ordered to turn over letters to court-appointed examiner in investigation of a
fraudulent conveyance); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (trustee's interests in obtaining debtor corporation's information overcomes former manager's claim to the privilege), aff'd sub noa. on other grounds, Weissman v. Hassett (In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe,
Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 45, 50 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976) (attorney-client privilege does
not rise to the level of a constitutional privilege).
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privilege, which is not of constitutional or even statutory proportions,
cannot prevent the same transfer.""" Clearly, the Fuller rationale
will not apply where oral testimony of the debtor's attorney is sought
since title or possession of a person's own words do not pass to the
trustee.18 2 The reported decisions, however, reveal that in almost
every case, the production of documents (either alone or together
with oral testimony) is sought from the debtor's attorneys. By analogy, Fuller would allow the trustee in all cases and in all chapters to
procure most, if not all, of the desired information so long as such
information was documentary in nature.
It is important to note that Fuller does not implicitly adopt the
argument that the debtor's constitutional (or attorney-client) privilege passes to the trustee with the property of the estate. Rather,
Fuller suggests that such privileges remain with the debtor, but are
rendered inapplicable due to the legal fiction that the property
sought to be retained has already passed to (and been disclosed to)
the trustee. Although a flood of Supreme Court cases dealt with the
fourth and fifth amendments since the Fuller decision in 1923'183
Fuller itself was never explicitly overruled. Fuller, therefore, remains a simple across-the-board solution for all cases falling outside
the scope of the Weintraub holding.
B. Separate Solutions for Separate Situations
An alternative to adopting Fuller is to utilize Weintraub in developing a system of different rules for different classes of debtors.
Such a system focuses on the type of debtor involved and takes into
account the inherent and significant distinctions between the classes
of debtors, especially as these distinctions bear upon the nature and
policies of the attorney-client privilege. For example, as noted in
Weintraub, corporations and individuals are treated dissimilarly in
connection with the privilege under non-bankruptcy law.184 With respect to corporations, it is well established that the privilege belongs
exclusively to the corporation itself, and is exercised only through
the corporation's authorized agents.18a The directors and officers of a
corporation have a valid expectation of control over the privilege
181.
182.

See cases cited supra note 180.
See Amjoe, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 49.

183. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).

184.

105 S. Ct. at 1990-91.

185.

Id. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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only so long as they remain employed as agents of the corporation.
Once the agency relationship terminates, control over the privilege
passes to new management, and the former directors and officers assume the risk that the new agents of the corporation will disclose
what was once the confidential information of the former
management.18 6
The privilege of an individual, on the other hand, does not depend upon an agency relationship and is treated differently under
non-bankruptcy attorney-client privilege law. An individual client,
unlike an agent of a corporate client, can never lose his right to assert the privilege unless the communication fits within the established exceptions,"8 ' nor can the individual's control of the privilege
be vetoed by third parties.
The application of these Weintraub based rules to non-corporate
chapter 7 debtors 88 involves a three-step process. First, it must be
determined whether, and to what extent, the debtor's management is
based upon an agency relationship. Second, state law must be examined to determine whether the debtor's agents can somehow be
removed or replaced without terminating the entity. Third, state law
should be applied to determine whether the managing agents retain
any control over the principal entity's attorney-client privilege after
removal. If not, then the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee can be
deemed analogous to "new management" of the entity, and, as under
non-bankruptcy law, the former managing agents surrender control
over the privilege to the new agent.
The application of the Weintraub model to chapter 11 debtors
entails a different approach due to the differences between the reorganization process and the liquidation process. Unlike the directors
of a chapter 7 corporation who are "completely ousted"189 and retain
"virtually no management powers"190 in bankruptcy, the directors of
a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession continue to manage, control and
operate the corporation.1 91 A chapter 11 trustee may only be appointed "for cause" and after notice and a hearing. 92 Furthermore,
186.

See supra note 185, notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

187. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
188. This analysis assumes that Weintraub's holding is limited solely to corporate debtors in chapter 7. For a partial list of other possible chapter 7 debtors, see supra note 172.
189. 105 S. Ct. at 1993 (citation omitted).

190.

Id.

191. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). In chapter 7, an interim trustee is appointed
"promptly after the order for relief" and continues to serve until a permanent trustee is
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in chapter 11, a trustee may be removed and the debtor restored to
possession and management.19 3 Moreover, the appointment of a
chapter 11 trustee does not constitute an automatic ouster of the
debtor's management as in chapter 7. Rather, the chapter 11 trustee
investigates the debtor's affairs and determines which, if any, of the
debtor's management is to be replaced.19 4
Accordingly, the Weintraub Court's use of Butner v. United
States to resolve the chapter 7 situation is not immediately applicable to the chapter 11 situation, since the actor in reorganization
cases most closely analogous to the debtor's management outside of
bankruptcy is, in the majority of cases, the debtor's directors, not the
trustee. 19 5 In order to apply the three-step Weintraub model to chapter 11 cases, a fourth step is required. This step entails ascertaining
the extent to which the trustee has displaced the debtor's management. If the debtor's management has been retained by the trustee
during the bankruptcy case, then the privilege should remain with
the management and not pass to the trustee. If the majority of the
debtor's management has resigned or been removed by the trustee,
the debtor's privilege should vest in the trustee.
A problem arises with the use of Weintraub-basedmodels where
the debtor is a close corporation.196 A key factor in the Weintraub
decision was that, under non-bankruptcy law, "[d]isplaced managers
elected. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). If the creditors fail to elect a trustee, the interim trustee
becomes the permanent trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 702(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). In chapter 11,
on the other hand, a trustee is generally never appointed. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and
1107 (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. 11 1985).
194. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 1106 and 1108 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). See also 11 U.S.C. §
327 (1982 & Supp. 111985); BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at 1 8.13. Additionally, §§ 1104 and 1106 authorize the use of an "examiner" whose function is to investigate the
debtor's affairs without the removal of the debtor's management.
195. See BANKRUFTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 29, at 1 8.13.
196. There is no uniform definition of a private or close corporation. Generally, state
corporate laws provide that to qualify as a close corporation the corporate stock must be held
by a limited number of shareholders (usually less than 10 shareholders), the issued stock of all
classes must be subject to certain restrictions on transfer and the corporation must make no
public offering of its stock. Additionally, close corporations are characterized by management
vested in the shareholders/owners rather than by centralized management vested in a board of
directors and by higher quorum requirements for shareholder and director meetings. See generally O'Neal, Close CorporationLegislation: A Survey and an Evaluation, 1972 DUKE LJ.
867, 873-85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342, 346, 349, 350, 354 (1983 & Supp.
1985); CALIF. CORP. CODE §§ 158, 300 (West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 55-1 to 175
(1965); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-11.1 to 31.2 (Supp. 1971). Under Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code, in order to merit special tax consideration, close corporations must have only
one class of stock and have 10 or less shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 1371-77 (1954).
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1 ' 97
may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers.
With close corporations, however, it makes little sense to refer to
managers who are "displaced" by shareholders' vote or by takeovers,
since the directors and managers of many close corporations are also
the sole or majority shareholders. Moreover, in the typical close corporation with only one or two shareholders, both the corporation and
the officers/shareholders generally employ the same legal counsel.198
Within a close corporation, therefore, the distinctions between the
corporation and its shareholders blur, and the interests and rights of
the two entities become difficult to separate. Upon bankruptcy, questions of propriety arise: To which party does the former attorney
owe his loyalty and duty not to disclose confidential information? If
the attorney is deemed to represent the close corporation, can he use
his confidential information from the individual in a suit against the
shareholder/officer/director for breach of fiduciary duty? Clearly,
the unique circumstances of the close corporation merit individualized analysis.
The dilemma of who controls the privilege with close corporations in bankruptcy was raised in In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America,199 where a close corporation and its sole
shareholder were involved in two jointly administered liquidation
proceedings. The single trustee for the two debtors sought the testimony of the attorney who had represented both debtors, but the attorney asserted the privilege. 20 0 The court held that, since there were
essential differences between a corporation and an individual, the
trustee could waive only the corporate debtor's privilege.20 1 The
court, however, failed to distinguish between publicly held corporations and close corporations, and the court's order reveals the potentially absurd results which can occur by a failure to do so: "Mr.
Barron [the attorney] shall not disclose any communication made by
...[the individual debtor] to him as attorney pertaining to his personal affairs rather than the corporate affairs."202 The court's order
placed the attorney in the precarious position of deciding which
statements and information from his sole shareholder/client related
to corporate matters and which related to personal matters. It is ob-

197.

Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1991.

198. See supra note 196.
199.
200.
201.
202.

27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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vious that when a sole shareholder is involved, corporate and personal affairs often merge. The Silvio decision, accordingly, places an
almost impossible burden upon the attorney by failing to take into
account the special nature of the close corporation.
In light of Silvio and the problems which may arise solely in the
close corporation area, it is necessary to distinguish close corporations from larger, publicly-held corporations with respect to the attorney-client privilege. Since the close corporation rarely has more
than one or two shareholders (who are also directors and officers), as
well as a substantially lesser degree of observation of corporate formalities, it should be treated as an individual debtor in terms of the
privilege. This rule is logically consistent with the policy supporting
the privilege rule for publicly-held corporations. The trustee of a
close corporation debtor cannot be said to become "new" management of a corporation with a single shareholder/officer/director.
Furthermore, allowing the trustee to control the close corporation's
privilege would significantly chill communications between sole
shareholders and their attorneys, since the attorney can be compelled
to reveal corporate confidences solely upon changes in the close corporation's economic status. While the same could be said about publicly-held corporations, 0 3 there is a difference in degree which justifies different rules for close corporations and publicly-held
corporations: The board of directors and officers of a large publiclyheld corporation often change frequently, while a close corporation's
management rarely, if ever, changes. While the appointment of a
trustee in bankruptcy can be analogized to a change in management
within publicly-held corporations (which are expected to undergo
frequent changes in management), the same analogy does not apply
as neatly in the close corporation context. Moreover, since former
management has no control over the corporate privilege, management of publicly-held corporations, due to a high turnover rate, have
a lesser degree of expectation and reliance upon the corporate privilege than does the management of a close corporation. In sum, if
different rules are adopted for different classes of debtors, an independent rule should also be formulated for close corporations which
parallels the rule applicable to individual debtors.
203. This argument was accepted by the Seventh Circuit in Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338,
343 (7th Cir. 1984), where, according to the court, the trustee's interest in investigating the
corporate debtor's affairs did not justify an "erosion of the corporation's attorney-client privilege simply on the basis of a change in economic circumstances."
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C. Individual Debtors
Although the Weintraub Court expressly declined to extend its
holding to individual debtors, 20 4 the Court did not state definitively
that individual debtors retain their attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy. 20 5 The Court simply stated that the "trustee as representative of the estate" theory was not applicable because "an individual,
in contrast, can act for himself; there is no management that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. ' 20 6 The Court
left open the possibility that an individual debtor could lose his privilege to the trustee, stating that if "control over that privilege passes
to the trustee, it must be '2under
some theory different from the one
07
we embrace in this case.
The most likely contender for the "different theory" is clearly
the "privilege as property of the estate" theory.208 As previously
noted, the argument that the debtor's attorney-client privilege is a
form of property which passes to the trustee should be rejected as
unsound. 20 9 Furthermore, courts should reject all other theories
aimed at depriving the individual debtor of the attorney-client privilege. With regard to corporate clients, the chilling effect of the loss
of the privilege is mitigated by the fact that each individual director,
officer, and agent of the corporation retains his or her individual
privilege.210 With regard to individual debtors, such protection is
204.

105 S. Ct. at 1995 ("[O]ur holding today has no bearing on the problem of individ-

ual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case.").

205. All courts deciding this issue, with one exception, have held that an individual does
not lose control over the privilege to the trustee in bankruptcy. See In re Silvio de Lindegg

Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (trustee can waive corporate
debtor's privilege but not individual debtor's privilege); In re Butcher, 38 Bankr. 796, 801 n.9
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (trustee may not waive individual debtor's privilege); Weintraub,
722 F.2d at 342-43 (dictum) (trustee may not waive individual debtor's privilege). But see In
re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (trustee has power to waive individual debtor's
privilege).
206. 105 S. Ct. at 1995.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 48-107 and accompanying text.

209. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1992 ("an attorney could invoke the personal
attorney-client privilege of an individual manager"); Citibank v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1196

(8th Cir. 1981) (trustee can waive corporate debtor's privilege but corporate officers may assert their individual attorney-client privilege in other proceedings). See also In re Silvio de

Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (trustee can waive
the corporate debtor's privilege, but not the individual debtor's privilege). In Silvio, the court

recognized that corporations and individuals are different entities and are often treated dissimilarly: "An individual can be sent to prison on the testimony of his attorney divulging a confidence. A corporation cannot suffer any penalty greater than the loss of its fiscal assets." Id. It
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lacking and the chilling effect is potentially substantial. A rational
individual would not divulge sensitive information to an attorney
who might be forced to reveal the information if the individual suffers a financial reversal.211 Accordingly, all courts should decline the
Weintraub Court's invitation to address some theory which would
divest the individual of his attorney-client privilege.
D.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Assuming that a trustee is vested with the power to control the
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege, the issue arises as to
what restraints or standards are imposed upon the trustee in the exercise of that privilege. What remedies are available to debtors affected by the trustee's waiver or assertion of the privilege? At present, no court has addressed these issues directly.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,212
the Supreme Court emphasized that the trustee, in essence, becomes
a new director of the corporate debtor 21 3 but, due to the nature of
bankruptcy, the trustee-director's fiduciary duty runs to creditors as
well as to shareholders. 1 4 If the trustee stands in the shoes of the
debtor's directors, then the trustee controls the privilege subject to
the same restrictions and limitations imposed on directors of a solvent corporation. Accordingly, the trustee does not have unfettered
control over the privilege. The trustee should be able to assert or
waive the privilege only when it is in the best interest of the corposhould be noted, however, that corporate employees, including management, can be sent to jail
on the basis of corporate attorneys divulging information. Thus, the court was correct in noting
the distinction between corporations and individuals, but espoused an incorrect distinction in
the opinion.
211. The case of In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982), was, therefore,
incorrectly decided. In Smith, the court relied on O.P.M., Andros, and Blier Cedar in holding
that the trustee can waive the individual debtor's attorney-client privilege. Id. at 5. The Smith
court failed to distinguish between corporate and individual debtors, and thus incorrectly cited
cases concerning the trustee's waiver of a corporate debtor's privilege as authority for waiver
with individual debtors. The Smith court also failed to realize the effect of its holding: Clients
would rarely, if ever, reveal confidences to their attorneys since a mere change in the client's
economic status would be a sufficient basis to require disclosure of the client's confidences. The
analysis of Smith has been rejected by all other courts addressing the trustee's ability to waive
the individual debtor's privilege. See Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342-343; In re Silvio de Lindegg
Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Butcher, 38 Bankr.
796, 801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
212, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985).
213. Id. at 1993. The Court noted that "when a trustee is appointed, he assumes control
of the business, and the debtor's directors are 'completely ousted.'" Id. (citation omitted).
214. Id. at 1994.
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rate debtor. In bankruptcy, this is generally synonymous with maximizing the estate for creditors.
A party who determines that the trustee's exercise of the
debtor's privilege is detrimental to the estate is not without a remedy. In Weintraub, the Court stated that "[tihe propriety of the
trustee's waiver of the attorney-client privilege in a particular case
can, of course, be challenged in the bankruptcy court on the ground
that it violates the trustee's fidiciary duties."21 5 The affected partiesin-interest may sue the trustee to recover any damages to the estate
arising from the trustee's failure to exercise the privilege consistent
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders and creditors. 16 Moreover, if
the party desires to act prior to the disclosure of privileged information, such party may bring a proceeding to remove the trustee, 17 or
to prevent the waiver of the debtor's privilege on the ground that
such waiver constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty which will be
harmful to the estate. Finally, if the trustee does "stand in the
shoes" of the directors, aggrieved shareholders may be entitled to sue
the trustee in state court in a shareholder derivative action.21
In sum, after Weintraub, the focus is not on the trustee's power
to waive the privilege, but rather on the propriety of such waiver.
This shift in focus is appropriate since the trustee's exposure to potential liability for hasty or automatic waivers of the privilege should
lead to exercises of the privilege which are based upon a thoughtful
review of the consequences to the debtor's estate. Thus, waivers of
the privilege will not become an automatic event in corporate bankruptcies. Consequently, the chilling effect of removing the privilege
from the debtor may be minimized.

215. Id. at n. 7.
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 322 (1982 & Supp. II 1985), which provides that all trustees must
file a bond with the court within 5 days after selection. Although not personally liable, the

trustee still may be sued and the bond proceeds used to reimburse the estate or the affected
party. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (1982), (providing statutory authorization for suits
against a trustee); BANKR. R. 2001(b), 2008, and 2010 (Supp. 11 1985) ("[a] proceeding on
the trustee's bond may be brought by any party in interest . . . for the use of the person
...
BANKR. R. 2010(d) (Supp. H 1985)).
injured.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 324 (1982).
218. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1983). See also Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at
1994 n.7. The Weintraub Court did not state whether the bankruptcy court would have exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction with the district court and/or state courts over these

matters. Further, it is not clear whether such a proceeding in bankruptcy court would be a
"core" proceeding under the Code, enabling the bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 157 (Supp. II 1985).
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E. Pre-petition and Post-petition Communications
Regardless of the solution adopted, it is imperative that courts
distinguish between pre-petition and post-petition communications of
the debtor-client and its counsel. Courts consistently fail to do so,
and the ramifications of this failure are substantial. In situations
where the trustee is granted control over the debtor's privilege, such
control must be restricted solely to pre-petition communications, and
the debtor should retain the privilege as to post-petition communications. If no distinction is made, and the trustee has access to postpetition communications, the debtor will not confide in counsel during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor
will not be adequately represented and will fail to receive the necessary legal advice required for attempting a meaningful fresh start. In
short, any benefit from granting the trustee access to post-petition
communications is clearly outweighed by the serious chilling effect
on debtor-attorney communications, and courts should carefully delineate the limits of their holdings in favor of trustees with respect to
pre-petition communications. 1 9
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Weintraub220 resolved some of the issues
concerning the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy, other important issues remain unresolved.2 21 The Weintraub decision also raises
several issues which may require litigation for resolution.22 Accordingly, the lower courts must continue to address various privilege issues without statutory or case law authority for guidance. Any solution which is ultimately adopted, whether as an across-the-board
measure or on a case by case basis, must balance the competing policies of the need for the full disclosure of evidence with the client's
need to have his confidential communications with his attorney protected. 223 Furthermore, structuring a solution will require careful
219. While the Supreme Court in Weintraub did not address the distinction between
pre-petition and post-petition communications, the Court held "that the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications." 105 S. Ct. at 1996. See Shaeffer v. Wagner, 765
F.2d 133, 134 (10th Cir. 1985).
220. 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985).
221. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
223. Even if all courts hold that the debtor's privilege never passes to the trustee, the
trustee will be able to procure some attorney-client information due to the following exceptions
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analysis of how the proposed solution will affect attorney-client relationships, not just within bankruptcy, but in other areas as well, including post-petition situations. Since traditional non-bankruptcy attorney-client privilege law treats corporate and individual clients
differently, bankruptcy courts should follow suit. In this way, clients
outside of bankruptcy can predict with confidence the extent to
which their communications will be protected. This predictability
and stability will, in turn, prevent a chill in attorney-client communications, and preserve the all important attorney-client relationship.

Neil E. Herman

to the protections of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) The privilege is narrowly construed against the party asserting it. See supra
note 23.
(2) The privilege is deemed waived unless timely and affirmatively asserted by the
client. See, e.g., Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (where corporate debtor fails to make "affirmative claim of privilege," attorneys for corporation must testify regarding confidential corporate matters, despite court's conclusion
that trustee does not control corporate debtor's privilege).
(3) The privilege does not protect communications concerning prospective or ongoing crimes, frauds, torts, fraudulent transfers and preferences. See supra notes 2328 and accompanying text.
(4) The Code of Professional Responsibility, in DR 4-101(C)(4), provides that an
attorney may reveal a client's confidences to establish or collect a fee, or to defend
himself against any accusations of wrongful conduct. See supra notes 150-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of DR 4-101 and its effect on the privilege.
(5) FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) allows discovery of an attorney's work product in limited cases where "substantial need" and "undue hardship" are present.
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